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Abstract: The shortfall in the funding for construction, operation and maintenance of 
road infrastructure in Australia is substantial and future investment appears to be 
beyond the capabilities of government funding alone. In the past, the private sector 
has proven very willing to invest in PPPs with government to provide road 
infrastructure and, overall, its performance in relation to construction, operation and 
maintenance has been far superior to that of government and has relieved 
government of substantial risk. However, it is unlikely that the private sector will 
accept the same levels of risk on new PPPs as in the past. 





The shortfall in the funding for construction, operation and maintenance of road infrastructure 
in Australia is substantial and future investment appears to be beyond the capabilities of 
government funding alone. In the past, the private sector has proven very willing to invest in 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) with government for the provision of road infrastructure and, 
overall, its performance in relation to construction, operation and maintenance has been superior 
to that of government and has relieved government of substantial risk. However, it is likely that 
the private sector will not accept the same levels of risk on greenfield PPPs as they have in the 
past. This paper: 
 
• provides a picture of past performance and risk management of Australian road PPPs; 
• investigates barriers that exist for efficient future procurement (including the allocation 
of risk); 
• attempts to look afresh at the purpose of urban and inter-urban motorways and 
congestion and questions whether patchwork tolling exacerbates the problem; and  
• considers a number of PPP models and makes some recommendations relevant to future 
procurement. 
 
II. Historical Summary 
 
In the early days of road construction in Australia, tollroads, toll ferries and toll bridges were 
the norm, largely funded by private enterprise. This changed completely during the last century 
with the rise of the State-owned road agencies who eventually took control of almost all road 
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transport. Roads, bridges and ferries became regarded by the public as “free”, which really meant 
paid for out of taxes.  
 
The 1970’s saw governments becoming aware that the growing demand for road funding was 
competing with other government priorities (in particular, health and education) and, at the same 
time, the growth of cities was placing greater pressure on road systems. This led to the 
introduction of user-funded PPPs, starting with the Sydney Harbour Tunnel, followed closely by 
the M4 Motorway and the M5 South West Motorway, all in NSW. 
 
Whilst the PPP model used for these and later tollroads has changed over the years, the central 
premise that a PPP concession must “stand alone” financially has not. All PPPs which rely on 
tolls are based on a financial model which sets the toll to generate revenue sufficient to fund the 
project, sometimes in combination with a contribution from the State. User-funded PPPs also 
move the capital expenditure for the asset off the State’s balance sheet. 
 
The State Agencies of last century set aside large corridors for road development. Most of 
these have now been utilised. In addition, community concerns related to noise, urban amenity 
and pollution have seen many roads (even where there is a corridor available) being diverted 
underground. Consequently, the cost of construction of new motorways has increased 
considerably. Tunnels can cost as much as ten times their surface road equivalent, further 
stretching government’s budgets and making it more and more difficult to fund PPP road 
projects on a “stand alone” basis. 
 
At the same time, there have been a number of financial failures of road PPPs, resulting in 
considerable losses to the original investors, but not to the State. As a result, most private sector 
financiers and constructors have now become very reticent to invest in greenfield PPPs where 
they are expected to accept patronage risk. Furthermore, conservative investors such as 
superannuation funds find it difficult to commit to investments involving patronage risk. With 
governments short of cash and reticent to borrow, this has led to a search for alternative PPP 
models which lessen or remove the requirement for the private sector to accept patronage risk. 
 
III. What does the State want from a PPP? 
 
The State is responsible for network planning. These days, when the State has approached the 
private sector to build and operate a PPP road project, it has been seeking the following from the 
successful bidder: 
 
• To “infill” a gap in the planned motorway network; 
• To effectively manage its own affairs, including all the following; 
• To fund the project, either in its entirety or with a government contribution;  
• To design the project, working in collaboration with government guidelines, reference 
designs and legislation, but usually seeking innovative solutions; 
• To construct the project in accordance with the approved design; 
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• To maintain the road corridor, including pavement, landscaping, fences, signage,  
tolling equipment, control centre and all roadside communications, controls and 
messaging; 
• To operate the road, including manning the control centre, managing access, controlling 
traffic speed, congestion (to the extent possible), incident response, network 
cooperation, attending incidents and cooperation with emergency services; 
• To operate a tolling system which enables customers to use their vehicles on the project 
road and all other Australian tollroads, including building good relationships with 
customers and providing effective service; 
• To demonstrate that the PPP entity is a good corporate citizen; and 
• To be an effective issues manager and to minimise the negative impacts to the State of 
issues arising from the PPP concession. 
 
More recently, some States, acknowledging the longevity of the relationships between the 
PPP entity and the State, have been seeking mechanisms to address:  
 
• Future expansion and development of the asset; 
• Quality of service through the introduction of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) along 
with financial penalties for non-performance. 
In addition  to tollroads operated by the State (State Full Responsibility), there are two broad 
categories which the State has used for PPPs. These are Full Concession and Hybrids. 
 Full Concession  
A private sector consortium is responsible for finance, design, construct, operate and maintain 
under a concession agreement. The consortium manages customers, tolls the facility and accepts 
all patronage risk. Some concessions subcontract their customer service activities to others, but 
remain responsible for them. Later concessions usually have an upside toll revenue sharing 
arrangement with the State and some have KPIs with penalties for under-performance. 
Concession periods can vary between 20 and 99 years, but most have been around 30 to 50 
years. Some earlier concessions could escalate tolls in excess of CPI, but later ones are limited to 
increases not exceeding CPI. 
 Hybrids  
These lie somewhere between State Full Responsibility and Full Concession, as noted in 
Table 1 and have taken a number of forms. 
 
“Right to toll” concession 
A hybrid where the State (or, in Queensland, Brisbane City Council (BCC)) initially 
undertakes the financing, design and construction, operation and maintenance (and sometimes, 
tolling), but once patronage ramp-up is complete, tenders a concession for the operation and 
maintenance with the right to charge customers a toll. Concession periods are generally much 
shorter because they do not need to amortise the cost of the initial capital works which is borne 
by the State. There may be risk and benefit sharing with the State in the form of a “cap and 
collar” to toll revenue. 
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This model is similar to PPPs used for social infrastructure. The private sector concessionaire 
funds, designs and constructs, operates and maintains for an agreed concession period. The road 
is free to customers. The concessionaire receives fixed payments for the life of concession with 
penalties if the road is unavailable (in part or in full) for longer periods than agreed or if KPIs are 
not met. 
 





NSW    
Sydney Harbour Tunnel 
(SHTC) 
1992 Hybrid Concession design, construct, maintain, 
with State to operate and toll. State pays 
SHTC a payment based on traffic 
revenue, but with a minimum payment to 
protect downside risk to SHTC  
M4 Motorway 1991 Was Full Concession, now 
Freeway 
 
M5 South West 
Motorway 
1992 Full concession  
M2 (Hills) Motorway 1997 Full concession Tolls escalate in excess of CPI 
Eastern Distributor 1999 Full concession Tolls escalate in excess of CPI 
M7 Westlink 2005 Full concession Upside profit sharing 
Cross City Tunnel 2005 Full concession Contribution to the State 
Lane Cove Tunnel 2007 Full concession  
WestConnex ??? Not yet known Will be tolled 
Victoria    
Citylink 1999 Full concession Upside profit sharing 
Eastlink 2008 Full concession Upside profit sharing, KPIs on 
performance 
Peninsula Link 2013 Availability model  
East-West Link 2015? Hybrid Proposed to be built and funded as an 
Availability Model, but will be tolled 
with revenue to the State. The State may 
later sell a Right to Toll concession 
Queensland    
Logan, Gateway 
motorways 
2011 Full concession Originally fully government owned and 
built, now effectively privatised 
concession. Upside profit sharing, KPIs 
on performance, UPD (see below) 
CLEM 7 tunnel 2010 Full concession Under receivership. Currently being sold 
Airport Link 2012 Full concession Under receivership 
Go Between Bridge 2013 Right to toll Originally procured by BCC under D&C, 
fully financed by BCC with tolling 
contracted but revenue to BCC. Now 
being sold as “right to toll” concession   
Legacy Way 2013 Right to toll Under construction as D&C contract fully 
financed by BCC. Now being sold as 
“right to toll” concession with “cap and 
collar” on toll revenues 
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IV. The evolution of PPP concessions in Australia 
 
One can trace the evolution of PPPs in Australia as going through the following periods over 
the past two decades. An example of each phase is noted: 
• Phase 1: PPP with private negotiation, private sector funding, assured revenue   with 
upside revenue potential based on patronage (SH Tunnel). 
• Phase 2: PPP tollroad tendered primarily on lowest toll, full (or part) private sector 
funding, full patronage risk borne by private sector (M5 South West).  
• Phase 3: As phase 2, but also tendered with Key Performance Indicators and penalties 
for under-performance and with upside revenue or profit sharing (Eastlink) 
• Phase 4: As phase 2, but also tendered on size of lump sum contribution to the State 
(Cross City Tunnel) 
 
The following two phases demonstrate the more recent search for alternate ways to deal with 
patronage risk. 
 
• Phase 5A: Ways to minimise patronage risk (availability models) (Peninsular Link) 
• Phase 5B: Cap and collar arrangement which shares patronage risk and reward (Legacy 
Way). 
 
There is a link between the procurement options and the appetite of the private sector to 
accept patronage risk. Early tollroad concessions were bid on higher Returns on Equity (ROE) 
with higher allowances for risk and were thus more profitable even when patronage did not reach 
forecast levels (as it often failed to do). In some cases patronage risk was ameliorated by a long 
concession period and higher than CPI escalation rates for tolls. Later, these two measures 
disappeared as a result of competition to win bids. As governments became more aware of the 
profitability of concessions, they sought tighter deals under more rigorous and demanding 
contracts and the private sector was willing to oblige. Because of the success of some earlier 
concessions, a bid fever developed with bidders trying harder to win. There is no doubt that a 
“death spiral” developed wherein bidders placed pressure on modellers to reduce patronage 
forecasts – the very forecasts which were the key to the viability of their bids. 
 
The key players in the establishment of bid consortia are the bid manager/financial adviser, 
the equity investor, the constructor and the operator. They come together to form the Single 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) which makes the bid. In some cases the operator has been a subsidiary 
company of the constructor and becomes a sub-contractor to the SPV rather than an equity 
partner.  
 
The constructor and the financial adviser have little interest in remaining as equity investors 
in the SPV once construction is complete. In a number of cases, the SPVs have found themselves 
dominated by the constructors during construction. The constructors and bid advisers then sell 
their equity and move on, leaving  the SPV to deal with its longer term issues, in some cases with 
little control over the operator and its costs.  
 
Australian governments have become more aware with time of the necessity for the SPV to be 
able to demonstrate its ability to operate effectively. Consequently, later concessions have 
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required that the constructor’s equity, supported by its balance sheet, remain in place for some 
period following construction. They have also mandated improved operation and maintenance 
through the provision of KPIs and performance penalties. These measures have strengthened the 
arm of the SPV in controlling its obligations. 
 
A further evolution has seen the introduction into two concessions in Queensland of an 
Upgrade Process Deed which sets out a mechanism for the State to procure additional works 
either on or adjacent to the concession. The intent is to make such a process easier, quicker and 
more effective for both parties. Since the concessions have long duration, this facilitates the 
process of accommodating unforseen change. For instance, if such a provision had been included 
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V. Australian tollroads and patronage 
 
This modern era evolution of Australian tollroads is unusual for a number of reasons.  All 
Australian tollroads are intra-urban, whereas most tollroads world-wide are inter-urban. 
Furthermore, the majority of tollroads world-wide remain in State ownership (often via State-
owned companies) and are considerably larger than Australian concessions. The fact that most 
Australian PPP concessions have required the private sector to accept patronage risk is unusual, 
though not unique.  
 
Furthermore, most PPPs worldwide have been in sectors other than road infrastructure and are 
based on availability concepts. Thus the Australian experiment in tollroads has little direct 
precedent. The forecasting of traffic volumes is a tricky business at the best of times, but the 
Australian experience has led to increased risks. For example: 
 
• The first stage in developing patronage forecasts is to analyse a network which is toll-
free. The second stage is to then adjust using parameters which consider the way 
motorists value time (in itself, a very difficult process). The first stage sets a level 
playing field which is subsequently adjusted in the second stage. The second stage 
compounds the uncertainty of the first stage. 
• The models work well on a corridor basis, less well for individual roads within the 
corridor and even less well for parts of individual roads. The smaller the focus, the 
higher the likely uncertainty.  
• Some small tunnel projects are extremely expensive. Without substantial government 
funding, this necessitates high tolls to fund the capital expenditure. Individual higher 
tolls on short distances of road increase patronage uncertainty and combinations of tolls 
further complicate the decision-making process for motorists, further increasing 
uncertainty in predicting route choice. 
• There may be other (as yet undefined) factors that encourage some motorists to avoid 
tunnels. 
• The network model (without the new road) is verified using the most recent available 
traffic counts. Thus this model can be considered to be an accurate description of 
current traffic volumes. The model is then modified to incorporate the new section of 
road and then projected forward over decades (see fig 2). Projections become less 
reliable the further forward they they look. Concession periods of 40 or 50 years (or 
more) are extremely difficult to forecast. In many cases, 85th percentile confidence 
levels can vary from the forecast by 50%.  
• The ramp-up period (see fig 2) from opening to “steady state” is not part of the model 
output. Rather, it is based on judgement, taking into account other ramp-up periods on 
other roads. The curve commences from an assumed initial traffic volume and merges 
over a period of 18 months to 3 years with the steady state curve. This is the most 
critical period in any concession’s life and will make or break the financial support for 
the concession. Most concessions fail during the ramp-up period if they are to fail.  
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Figure 2. Components of a road patronage forecast. 
 
From Table 2 and Fig 1, it can be seen that accuracy of patronage forecasts does not bear a 
close correlation with success or failure. A closer correlation is achieved it one looks at the toll 
per km and the type of asset. 
 













(see note 1) 
NSW     
Sydney Harbour Tunnel Very high Not known Mostly tunnel  
4.0 
0.50  
(see note 5) 
M4 Motorway High at end 
concession 
Satisfactory Road 
12-20? (see note 3) 
0 
M5 South West 
Motorway 
High Lower  Road 
22 
0.20 
Eastern Distributor High  Lower  Mostly tunnel 
6 
0.50  
(see note 5) 




M7 Westlink Good Lower  Road 
40 
0.18 
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Cross City Tunnel Low Much lower  Tunnel 
2.1 
2.33 
Lane Cove Tunnel Low Much lower  Mostly tunnel 
3.6 
0.84 
Victoria     
Citylink High Higher Road + tunnel 
22 
0.35 
Eastlink Good Lower, 
predominantly in the 
tunnel  
Road + tunnel 
39 
0.15 
Queensland     
Logan motorway Good Not known Road 
37 
0.09 
Gateway motorway  Not known Road + bridge 
31 
0.07 
CLEM 7 tunnel Low Much lower  Tunnel 
6.8 
0.61 
Airport Link Low Much lower  Mostly tunnel 
6.7 
0.56 




1. Tolls per km are calculated based on the longest possible trip on the concession in a car for an account 
holder using an electronic tag, taking into account trip caps where applicable.  
2. All tolls are current at 19 August 2013 and will change with time.  
3. The M4 motorway concession was for only some 6km of road. However, from a motorist’s perspective, the 
perception was more like 12 to 20 km. 
4. Tolls on Sydney Harbour Tunnel and Eastern Distributor have been halved since tolls are only applied in 
one direction. 
VI.    PPPs – Score Cards 
 
All PPPs have been very effective in transfer of the following risks from the States: Finance, 
patronage, D&C, operation, maintenance and customer service. More detail is provided below. 
 
Debt and equity: A number of PPPs have overestimated patronage and been unable to survive on 
original funding arrangements. So far, failed concessions have been resurrected through normal 
market operations such as refinancing, capital raisings, write downs and transfer of ownership. 
At no time has any State borne financial risk from a failed PPP, nor has there been any shortage 
of buyers for failed PPPs. 
 
Design and Construct: Variable standards of design, particularly in relation to urban architecture 
and landscaping (with Victoria so far well above the other States in their expectations and 
outcomes), some structural issues but, overall, a good to excellent standard of functionality. 
 
Management: All PPPs have been reasonably well managed. However, the most successful 
PPPs have been ones with a strong management, good contractual arrangements (particularly in 
relation to sub-contractors), a competent, collegiate Board who have developed a very good 
working relationship with the State. 
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Operate and Maintain: Variable with some concessions lacking adequate contractual power to 
ensure a high standard of maintenance, but, overall, a good to excellent standard. The standard of 
asset maintenance of PPPs is superior to that of the public sector assets. This is not a reflection 
on the public sector. The private sector PPPs are better able to provision for long term 
maintenance than are State owned entities subject to the budgeting pressures of government. 
 
Customer service: Very good in all PPPs with this functionality.  
 
Issues management: Overall, very good, especially when there are effective counter-parties 
within the State. The management of PPP concessions should be a dedicated function within 
government since these are invariably very complex relationships. 
VII. Barriers to Future PPPs 
 
Governments face a number of difficulties in future PPP procurement. Whilst some have been 
referred to previously, the list includes: 
 
The huge escalation in the cost of projects - There are few corridors set aside for new road 
infrastructure or even for road widening. Consequently more road infrastructure must be built in 
tunnels. 
 
Existing patchwork of highly variable tolls in some states (see table 2) - Since each PPP 
procured so far has been funded independently, tolls vary considerably and can be seen as a 
barrier by motorists to paying tolls on other portions of the road. The variability of tolls on 
concessions in NSW is producing unfortunate outcomes. Some tolls are far too high in relation to 
motorists’ perception of value for money and some of the tolls are escalating far more rapidly 
than others. A re-negotiation and rationalisation of tolls on existing concessions appears 
inevitable at some time in the future. Victoria has few problems in this regard and Queensland 
lies somewhere between the other two states. Congestion is enhanced by the patchwork 
approach. 
 
Patronage modelling uncertainties - There is little confidence that patronage modelling can 
demonstrate the reliability required by financiers and investors. However, this may be a position 
which will change with time.  
 
Public perceptions - Because the public’s viewpoint is based on the concept that roads should 
be funded from the public purse, tollroads remain fixed in the public perception as “double 
taxing”. Tollroads must demonstrate value for money to become accepted by motorists. Some 
do, but this remains a significant political risk. The task of providing the public with sufficient 
information to gain acceptance of tollroads has not yet  
VIII. A Way Forward? 
 
If we accept that PPPs have provided very good value to the States so far, future models 
should be built on what has been learned from existing models.  
Future models should contain the following features: 
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• A contract which encourages innovation in design, community services and operation. 
• A rounded and effective consortium for the Single Purpose Entity (SPE) who contracts 
with the State, comprising: 
o Reputable constructors with real balance sheets and the expectation of a long 
presence in Australia; 
o Sufficient equity with constructors and bid managers equity participation to 
extend (say) 12 months beyond opening; 
o A strong financier group in place with  Australian Banks well represented. Varied 
tenor; 
o An operator with a strong track record in operating road infrastructure and 
managing sub-contractors; 
o Adequate control of the destiny of the SPE. For instance: 
 Contracts for Design and Construction, which has adequate provisions for 
reporting, truly independent certification and retentions which assure that 
defects will be addressed promptly.  
 Maintenance and (if sub-contracted) customer service contracts which 
provide for regular “mark to market” assessments of contracts with 
provision to terminate if adjustments not agreed; 
• All bids being equal, a bid assessed on Return on Equity with the State accepting 
adequate provisions for risk in the assessment of Cost of Capital; and 
• A blueprint for future negotiation of modifications and upgrades to (and adjacent to) the 
asset. 
IX. How to deal with patronage risk? 
 
If patronage risk is to be passed on to the SPE, some means of assessing and rejecting 
outlying bids becomes necessary. One option is for the State to prepare a patronage forecast and 
require bidders to bid on that forecast and subsequently accept full patronage risk. The State 
would set the length of the concession and assess the bids on a bid model ROE and the quality of 
the bid offerings. It may be difficult to assemble an SPE capable of accepting this risk at this 
time for any Greenfield project. 
 
 Therefore, States might apply a “cap and collar” approach where the State accepts the 
outlying patronage downside risk and shares upside benefit. The sale of Legacy Way to 
Queensland Motorways takes this form. However, it only applies to a right to toll concession, 
construction having been undertaken separately. Similarly in Victoria, the East-West Link may 
be procured under a similar process, utilising an availability concession for procurement and a 
subsequent right to toll concession once patronage is established. 
 
An even more radical approach would require a restructure the motorway networks as follows: 
 
• Re-negotiate all existing concessions so that a uniform toll per kilometre is applied to 
the concessions and to all existing freeways. In Sydney this doubles the length of the 
tolled network. By having a uniform charge per kilometre, distortions caused by 
existing tolls are eliminated. The more expensive concessions are cross-subsidised by 
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the less expensive ones and by the tolls from existing freeways. In this way, patronage 
risk is amortised over the entire network and becomes almost negligible. 
• Apply the considerable revenue stream (after cross subsidies) to the procurement of new 
assets, preferably using the State’s revenue as seeding to capture private sector 
investment via PPPs.  
Conclusion 
 
The procurement by the States using PPP models for road infrastructure in Australia is still 
maturing, despite setbacks. Since they offer significant benefits to the states, it can be expected 
that PPPs will form a part of future procurement, though models may well change with time. 
 
 
